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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JOHN LELEAE,

Case No. 980189-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following are set forth in full in Addendum A:
U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1
Utah Const, art. I, § 7
Utah Const, art. I, § 12
Utah Const, art. I, § 13
Utah Const, art. I, § 24
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995)
U.R.E. 106
U.R.E. 611(a)
U.R.Cr.P. 18
ARGUMENT
POINT

I.
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE VICTIM
SUSTAINED "SERIOUS BODILY INJURY."

(Replying to State's brief at Point I, pp. 15-21)
A.

OVERVIEW OF RECENT
STATUTORY SCHEME.

CHANGES

TO

UTAH'S

Effective May 1, 1995, the legislature revamped Utah's
statutory scheme for assault and aggravated assault.

Prior to that

time, Utah recognized only two classes of injury: "bodily injury"
and "serious bodily injury."

Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3)

(1995), "bodily injury" was defined as "physical pain, illness, or
any impairment of physical condition."

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-

601(10)

(1995) defined "serious bodily injury'7 as "bodily injury

that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ,
or creates a substantial risk of death."
Under the former version of the code, an assault which
resulted in only "bodily injury" was a class B misdemeanor under
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102
"serious

bodily

injury"

(1995) .
was

An assault which resulted in

a third

degree

assault under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103

(1995).

felony

aggravated

The 1995 amendments added a third, intermediate level of
bodily injury, termed "substantial bodily injury."
§76-1-601(11)

(Supp. 1998).

Utah Code Ann.

The language used to describe both

"bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" remained unchanged.
"Substantial
amounting

bodily

to

injury"

serious

bodily

is defined

as

injury,

that

"bodily
creates

injury, not
or

causes

protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ."
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(11) (Supp. 1998).
Under these amendments, assault which results in only
"bodily injury" remains a class B misdemeanor.
76-5-102(2)

(Supp. 1998).

Assault which results in "substantial

bodily injury" is a class A misdemeanor.
102(3) (Supp. 1998).

Utah Code Ann. §

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-

Aggravated assault which results in "serious

bodily injury" is a second degree felony.
103(1) (a), -(2) (Supp. 1998).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-

Aggravated assault which fails to

cause serious bodily injury, but nevertheless involves use of a
2

weapon or "other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury," is a third degree felony.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-

103(l)(b), -(3) (Supp. 1998).
B.

CASES RELIED ON BY THE STATE FAIL TO
RECOGNIZE OR CONSIDER UTAH'S CURRENT
THREE TIER SYSTEM FOR CATEGORIZING BODILY
INJURY.
1.

Gardner, involving the assault by
prisoner statute, involves a two
tier system of categorizing bodily
injury.

First, the State cites a single Utah case, State v.
Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 651 (Utah 1997), for the proposition that
w

[a] broken arm, foot, or even finger would satisfy the [aggravated

assault by prisoner] statute's definition of serious bodily injury
as 'protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member.'"

First,

it

should

be

made

statement in Gardner was mere dicta.

clear

that

the

court's

The actual injury allegedly

inflicted by Gardner was much more than a mere "broken arm, foot,
or even

finger."

Gardner

"allegedly

stabbed

a fellow

inmate

multiple times in the face, neck, abdomen, and chest, causing
serious bodily injury."

Gardner, 947 P.2d at 631.

More importantly, Gardner was charged under the 1995
version of the code for a violation of aggravated assault by a
prisoner.

See Gardner, 947 P. 2d at 631-32.

Unlike Utah's assault

and aggravated assault statutes, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102,
103

(Supp.

1998),

the

aggravated

assault

codified at Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5

by prisoner

statute

(Supp. 1998) draws no

distinction between serious bodily injury and substantial bodily
3

injury.

The Supreme Court in Gardner had no occasion to determine

whether a

"broken arm, foot, or even finger" would

constitute

substantial bodily injury rather than serious bodily injury, as the
aggravated

assault

distinctions.

by

a

prisoner

statute

draws

no

such

Gardner is unhelpful in addressing the issue now

before this court.

While under a two tier system a mere "broken

arm, foot or even finger" may have qualified as "serious bodily
injury," under the present three tier system at issue here such an
injury which heals in its natural course should be considered only
"substantial bodily injury."
2.

Cases from other jurisdictions cited
by
the
State,
with
a
single
exception, involve two tier systems
of injury classification.

The State's reliance on cases from other jurisdictions is
similarly flawed, as none of those jurisdictions except Minnesota
have

a

three

tier

system

of

addressing

bodily

injury.

The

Minnesota statutory scheme is addressed at Point I.A.3., infra at
6.
Walker v. State, 742 P.2d 790 (Alaska App. 1987) . Alaska
uses a two tier system comparable to that used by Utah prior to
1995.

An assault in Alaska may be "assault in the first degree" if

a person causes "serious physical injury" to another. Alaska Stat.
§11.41.200 (1998).

"Serious physical injury" includes a physical

injury that causes "protracted loss or impairment of the function
of

a

body

member

or

organ.

.

.

."

Alaska

Stat.

§11. 81. 900 (b) (53) (B) (1998) . An assault in Alaska may be "assault
in the second degree" if the person only causes "physical injury"
4

to another.

Alaska Stat. §11.41.210.

However, Alaska has no

intermediate definition of injury that would include temporary loss
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
State v. Weiton. 300 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 1981) .
has only two tiers of physical injury.
(Supp.

1999)

(delineating

Iowa

Iowa Code Ann. § 708.2

separate penalties

for assault

with

intent to inflict serious injury versus and assault that causes
bodily

injury).

Iowa's

definition

of

"serious

injury"

is

essentially identical to that used by Utah and other states in
defining "serious physical injury" or "serious bodily injury," and
includes "protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ."

Iowa Code Ann. § 702.18

(quoted in

Welton. 300 N.W.2d at 159). Again, there is no intermediate level
of injury to cover temporary loss or impairment.
State v. Mentola, 691 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. App. 1985); State
v.

Pettit.

976

S.W.2d

585

(Mo. App.

1998).

Missouri

only

distinguishes between two levels of injury, and uses definitions
that

are

essentially

identical

in

pertinent

part

to

Utah's

definitions of "serious bodily injury" and "bodily injury," but
without an intermediate level.

See Mo. Ann. Stat. §565.002 and

§565.050 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 1999).
People v. Fosselman, 659 P.2d 1144, 1148

(Cal. 1983).

California does not have any intermediate level of bodily injury.
With reference to battery, the injury is either "serious bodily
injury" or "injury."

Cal. Penal Code §243(f) (4), -(5) (West 1999).

"Serious bodily injury" does include "protracted loss or impairment
5

of function of any bodily member or organ. . . , n id. , but there is
no intermediate level of injury to account for temporary loss or
impairment.

See id.

State v. Diaz, 612 So.2d 1019
Louisiana has a two tier system.
"serious bodily injury."

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1993) .

Second degree battery requires

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:34.1 (1997).

No

intermediate degree of bodily injury exists.
Commonwealth v. Nichols, 692 A.2d 181

(Pa. Super. Ct.

1979); Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 A.2d 1087 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
Pennsylvania has a two tier system.

"Bodily injury" and "serious

bodily injury" are defined in 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2301 (1998) . No
intermediate degree of bodily injury exists.
Each of the above cases is inapposite here, as none
address a three tier classification system such as Utah's scheme.
3.

Under
Minnesota's
three
tier
statutory scheme, a broken bone that
heals in the normal course would
only be substantial bodily injury.

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.02(7a) defines substantial bodily
harm as follows:
Subd.
7a.
Substantial
Bodily
Harm.
"Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury which
involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or
which causes a temporary but substantial loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ,
or which causes a fracture of any bodily member.
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.02(8) defines great bodily harm as follows:
Subd. 8.
Great Bodily Harm.
"Great bodily
harm" means bodily
injury which creates a high
probability of death, or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ or other serious bodily harm.
6

Minnesota's statutory scheme expressly makes a fractured
bone only substantial bodily harm.
here.

The same result should pertain

"Substantial bodily injury" in Utah is defined as "bodily

injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or
causes

protracted

physical

pain,

temporary

disfigurement,

or

temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ."
gravity

of

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10)
harm

associated

with

a

broken

(Supp. 1998).
bone

is

The

squarely

comparable to protracted physical pain or temporary disfigurement,
the other conditions which constitute substantial bodily injury.
At the time of trial, Mr. Brem's jaw was completely healed, except
that holding a flashlight in his mouth causes him pain.

Notably,

to the extent this pain is considered protracted physical pain, it
likewise places this injury in the "substantial bodily injury"
category.

In sum, any broken bone which is not life threatening

and heals normally in the usual time frame should be considered a
temporary

loss

or

impairment

"substantial bodily injury."

of

function,

making

the

injury

Because Mr. Brem's injury was not

"serious bodily injury," the trial court erred in allowing the
second degree felony aggravated assault charge to go to the jury.
State v. Bridcreforth, 357 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. App. 1984),
cited by the State at 19 n.6, 20, holds that the permanent loss of
a tooth constitutes great bodily injury.

The case does not address

a temporary loss of function, which would constitute substantial
bodily injury under Minnesota's statutory scheme.

7

C.

THE STATE'S PROPOSED STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
RENDERS THE DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANTIAL BODILY
INJURY"
SUPERFLUOUS
AND
MEANINGLESS,
IN
CONTRAVENTION
OF
SETTLED
PRINCIPLES
OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

The State suggests that this Court should not look beyond
the plain language of the definition of "serious bodily injury."
In essence, the State seeks to ignore the statutory changes enacted
by the legislature, and return to the two tier system employed up
until that time.

This Court is not at liberty to bury its head in

the sand and ignore a valid enactment of the legislature.
It is important to give effect to all provisions of a
statute.

This Court has noted:
Additionally, we adhere to the principle that
[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts
or sections and is animated by one general purpose
and intent.
Consequently, each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other
part or section so as to produce a harmonious
whole.
Thus, it is not proper to confine
interpretation
to
the
one
section
to
be
construed....
[W]hen interpreting a statute all
parts must be construed together without according
undue importance to a single or isolated portion.

State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 234-5

(Utah App. 1998)

(quoting 2A

Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 103
(5th ed.1992)

(footnotes omitted)).

The

State's

construction

renders all provisions addressing substantial bodily injury mere
surplusage.
Properly

construed,

using

all

appropriate

tools

of

statutory construction, a fractured bone that heals in the normal
course constitutes only substantial bodily injury, rather than
serious bodily injury.

This court should enter conviction for
8

class A misdemeanor assault causing substantial bodily injury in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)0)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5)

(Supp. 1998).

See

(1995) (allowing appellate court to

enter judgment for included offense if requested by defendant).
Alternatively,

this court may reverse and remand

for trial on

whether the State can meet the elements of third degree felony
aggravated assault under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1) (b) (Supp.
1998) .
POINT II. ERRORS IN JURY VOIR DIRE DEPRIVED MR.
LELEAE OF A FAIR TRIAL.
(Replying to State's brief at Point II, pp. 21-27)
A.

The

State

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO ASK QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED BY
THE DEFENSE.
argues

that

the

authority

cited

by

the

defendant to support the correctness of his proposed voir dire
question 41 actually "tends to reject, rather than support, the
propriety of this question."

(State's Br. at 24) (citing Allen v.

United States, 164 U.S. 492, 499-502, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528
(1896)).

The State argues that Allen stands for the proposition

that members of a jury should "keep an open mind in the face of
[an] opposing majority viewpoint."

(State's Br. at 24.)

This is

indeed part of what Allen stands for; but this does not undermine
the defendant's argument that question 41 was proper.

The jury in

Allen was properly instructed that "the verdict must be the verdict
of each

individual

juror, and not a mere acquiescence

conclusion of his fellows."

Allen, 164 U.S. at 501.

9

in the

Question 41 asked whether a juror would
verdict only because you were in the minority?"
146) .

u

change your

(R. 378:74; 139-

That question is proper under Allen, was not covered by

other voir dire, and should have been asked by the trial court.
affirmative

answer

that

a

juror

would

surrender

deeply

An

held

convictions merely because they were in the minority would support
a

challenge

for cause.

An equivocal

response

could

lead the

defense to exercise peremptory challenges differently.
Similarly, question 26 addressing whether

the

jurors

would evaluate the testimony of the defendant the same as other
witnesses was proper and should have been asked by the trial court.
Some persons have a tendency to discount or reject the testimony of
a criminal defendant merely because they have been charged.

Other

questioning by the trial court failed to address whether the jury
would fairly assess the testimony of Mr. Leleae.

This question

should have been asked.
Finally, question 49 concerning eyewitness identification
should have been asked.

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly

noted the problems inherent in eyewitness identification.

E.g.

State v. Loner, 721 P.2d 483, 488-92 (Utah 1986); State v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d

774, 779-80

recognized

(Utah 1991) .

that despite

In Long, the Supreme Court

"the weaknesses inherent

in eyewitness

identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these
problems.

People simply do not understand the deleterious effects

that certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory
processes

of

an

honest

eyewitness."
10

Long,

721

P. 2d

at

490

(citations omitted).

In fact, common knowledge held by jurors

regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications "often runs
contrary to documented research findings"; jurors generally give
tremendous weight to eyewitness identification testimony even where
the

credibility

counsel."

Jd.

of

the witness

is

"thoroughly

discredited

by

In light of these serious concerns, a perfunctory

"will you follow the law as stated by the judge?" is insufficient
to adequately probe for opinions and biases on the part of jurors
that are contrary to the law.1

Question 4 9 should have been asked.

The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to ask these
three questions.
B.

THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO GRANT A
FOR-CAUSE CHALLENGE AGAINST PROSPECTIVE
JUROR STEVEN WRIGHT.

A juror's relationship with the prosecutor or with police
officer witnesses raises the question of that juror's ability to be
impartial.

State v. Coxf 826 P.2d 656, 660 (UtahApp. 1992).

When

such a question is raised, the trial court has a duty to either
dismiss the potential juror or to question that person further as
to her ability to be impartial.
"The depth of

Cox, 826 P.2d at 660.

investigation

required

varies

in each

situation and xis necessarily dependent on the juror's responses to
the questions asked.

Nevertheless, the exploration should not be

merely pro forma.'" Cox, 826 P. 2d at 660 (quoting Woolley, 810 P. 2d
x

Taken literally, the State's position would reduce voir dire
to that single question. An affirmative response that jurors will
follow the law renders all other questions cumulative, and the
failure to ask additional questions harmless. Obviously, this is
not the law.
11

at 445).

"An inference of bias 'is generally not rebutted simply

by a subsequent general statement by the juror that he or she can
be fair and impartial.'" Cox, 826 P. 2d at 660 (quoting Woolley, 810
P. 2d at 445) .

"The court, not the juror, must determine a juror's

qualifications."
P.2d

473, 475

Cox, 826 P. 2d at 660 (quoting State v. Jones, 734

(Utah 1987), aff 'd, 808 P.2d

1056

(Utah 1991)).

Here, the trial court's questioning was pro forma and failed to
dispel the inference of bias raised by the jurors opinion that, in
essence, Detective Nudd is hard but fair, and does things that are
in a person's best interest.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE
COMPLETENESS DOCTRINE CLAIM.
Replying to State's brief at Point III, pp. 28-35)
The State criticizes defendant for citing only one case
that has held that the doctrine of completeness continues to apply
to oral statements.

(State's Br. at 30, citing United States v.

Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993).)

The State cites a

number of cases that have held that Rule 106 "is not applicable on
its plain language to oral statements," State's Br. at 30-31, yet
wholly

fails to cite any case that has held that the general

doctrine of completeness does not apply to oral statements.
Application

of

the doctrine

of

completeness

conversations is long-established in the common law.
only

a

partial

completeness.

codification
The

doctrine

of
of

the

common

completeness

law

to oral

Rule 106 is
doctrine

has been

of

further

codified in Rule 611(a) which does allow the application of the

12

doctrine of completeness to oral statements.

Haddad, 10 F.3d at

1258.
The Seventh Circuit in Haddad is not alone in applying
the

doctrine

of

completeness

to

oral

statements.

The

Tenth

Circuit, in an unreported opinion, has stated, "While Rule 106
explicitly applies only to writings and recorded statements, the
rule

of

completeness

embodied

in

Rule

106

is

substantially

applicable to oral testimony as well by virtue of Fed. R. Evid.
611(a), which obligates the court to make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth."

United

States v. Zamudio, No. 96-2182 (10th Cir. Apr. 6, 1998) (internal
quotations omitted)

(copy attached as addendum B) .

The Second

Circuit has held that the doctrine of completeness "is stated as to
writings in Fed. R. Evid. 106, but Fed R. Evid. 611(a) renders it
substantially applicable to oral testimony as well."

United States

v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 650 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989).
Other circuits have also indicated continuing approval
for

the

application

of

the

doctrine

statements through Rule 611 (a) .

of

completeness

to

oral

See United States v. Branch, 91

F.3d 699, 727-728 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Collicott, 92
F.3d 973, 984 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1996).
The court in the present case allowed the prosecution to
present a portion of the defendant's statement out of context.
Taken out of context, the meaning of the defendant's statement was
distorted.

The legal principle is simple:
[W]hether
embodiment

we
operate
under
Rule
106's
of the rule of completeness, or
13

under the more general provision of Rule
611(a), we remain guided by the overarching
principle that it is the trial court's
responsibility to exercise common sense and a
sense of fairness to protect the rights of the
parties while remaining ever mindful of the
court's obligation to protect the interest of
society in the 'ascertainment of truth.'
United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2nd Cir. 1987) .
The State argues that the doctrine of completeness does
"not serve to admit inadmissible hearsay."
State

confuses

the

issue

of

unrelated

State's Br. at 31. The
hearsay

statements,

as

opposed to related statements that must in fairness be considered
with the misleading portion sought to be introduced by a party.
The doctrine of completeness does not overcome the hearsay rule.
The complete statement, in context, must be admissible.

Here, the

prosecution offered Mr. Leleae's statement as a statement against
interest.

The rule of completeness requires that the statement not

be taken out of context.

Once placed in proper context, the court

must then assess whether the statement, in

proper

context,

is

admissible.
A review of the cases cited by the State demonstrates the
proper operation of the doctrine.

The State mis-cites United

States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1987) for the
proposition that "neither rule 106 nor rule 611 authorizes a court
to admit unexcepted
added).

hearsay."

(State's Br. at 32 n. 12) (emphasis

This is not what Woolbright says.

Woolbright held "that

neither Rule 106 . . . nor Rule 611 . . . empowers a court to admit
unrelated

hearsay. . . . "

Woolbright, 831 F.2d at 1395 (emphasis

added).
14

In

Woolbright,

the

district

court

had,

correctly,

admitted a statement of an unavailable witness as a statement
against penal interest, admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (3).
Woolbright, 831 F.2d at 1395.
evidence
ownership
admitted

a

statement

of
a

made

a particular
second

to

The defendant first offered into
police

piece

statement,

of

one

Randle

luggage.

holding

completeness required its admission.

by

that

The
the

claiming

court
doctrine

also
of

The second statement, which

was offered by the prosecution, had also been made by Randle, but
was only to the effect that Randle and the defendant were on a
honeymoon trip together.

The statement was made at a different

time,

to the question

and

was unrelated

of

ownership

of

the

luggage.
The court of appeals held that admission of the second
statement

could

not

be

justified

based

on

the

doctrine

of

completeness because the two statements were made at different
times and were unrelated in subject matter.

Woolbright, 831 F.2d

at 1395.
In the present case, the defendant sought to introduce
statements that came from the same conversation, which immediately
preceded and followed the statement introduced by the prosecution,
and which helped to explain that statement.

These statements are

clearly related to, and provide a proper context for understanding
the

meaning

of

the

statement

introduced

by

the

Woolbright does not support the State's position.

15

prosecution.

In United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692
1996) the court likewise refused to admit unrelated

(4th Cir.
statements

under the rule of completeness:
In this case, during direct examination Agent
Parker testified that the agents found a black
case containing some of the bait money while
searching Wilkerson's
car.
No
other

testimony about any portions of a
conversation
between the agents and Wilkerson
regarding
that particular
cache of money was introduced.
Thus, the rule of completeness . . . would not

have applied here where there was no
introduced
conversation
that
clarification
or
explanation.

partially
needed

Wilkerson, 84 F.3d at 696 (emphasis added).
In United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973
1996) , the

defendant

had properly

impeached

(9th Cir.

a witness'

trial

testimony by eliciting from a second witness testimony concerning
a prior inconsistent statement that had been made by the first
witness:
By introducing a portion of the conversation between [the
first and second witnesses], Collicott 'opened the door'
to other statements from that conversation which clarify
or provide context to [the first witness'] prior
inconsistent statements. However, the other statements
from [the conversation between the two witnesses] do not
clarify or provide context to her inconsistent statement
introduced by Collicott.
Collicott,

92

F.3d

at

982.

The purpose

of

the

doctrine

of

completeness would not have been served by the admission of the
subsequent statements "because there was no concern in this case
that Collicott introduced a misleadingly-tailored snippet from [the
conversation]."

Id. at 983.

In other words, the doctrine of

completeness was inapplicable because the offered evidence would
not have served to clarify the prior statement.
16

The State quotes Phoenix Associates III v. Stone, 60 F.3d
95, 103 (2nd Cir. 1995) out of context.

When read in its entirety

in proper context, the language quoted by the State from Phoenix
has a different meaning than the State's brief would lead one to
believe:
Rule 106 does not compel admission of otherwise
inadmissible hearsay evidence, and documents generally
are admitted under the Rule for the same purpose as the
primary documents they explain.
Phoenix, 60 F.3d at 103 (citations and quotations omitted).
The facts of the case help put this statement in proper
context.

The district court had allowed the defendant to introduce

into evidence the plaintiff's financial statements for the year of
1989.

Plaintiff then argued that the doctrine of completeness

required the court to also admit the work papers relied on in
preparing those documents.

The appellate court explained why and

how the work paper was necessary to understand the true meaning of
the financial statement.

As such, the work paper was admissible

under the doctrine of completeness.

Phoenix, 60 F.3d at 102.

In United States v. Burreson, 643 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th
Cir. 1981) , the prosecution had offered into evidence a portion of
a

transcript

of

testimony

previously

given

by

the

defendant.

Burreson, 643 F.2d at 1349. The defendant argued that the doctrine
of completeness required the admission of the remainder thereof.
The appellate court stated:
The record shows that the trial court carefully
considered
the
entire
transcript
[of
the
prior
testimony], and added material to the excerpt offered by
the government to put it in proper context. The court

concluded that the portion

appellants
17

wished

to

submit

was irrelevant
and was inadmissible hearsay.
This
decision was not an abuse of the District Court's
discretion, and appellants' argument is therefore without
merit.
Burreson, 643 F.2d at 1349 (emphasis added) . Those portions of the
transcript which were necessary to explain and put the excerpt in
its proper context were admitted.

The doctrine of completeness had

been applied.
A more accurate formulation of the rule exemplified by
the cases cited by the State would be that when the doctrine of
completeness

is inapplicable

to the evidence

in question, the

doctrine will not operate to make otherwise inadmissible evidence
admissible. However, when the evidence is necessary to explain and
place in context a statement already in evidence, it should be
admitted.
As set forth in his opening brief, the limited portion of
Mr. Leleae's statement introduced by the State was misleading,
leading the jury to draw the inference that because Mr. Leleae did
not "want to be a punk and just stand there and not doing nothing, "
he must have participated in the assault.

To the contrary, in

context Mr. Leleae was saying that he was trying to break up the
assault.

The trial court should have placed the statement in

proper context.
In an effort

to establish harmless error, the

State

concludes its argument on this issue with the observation that "the
entire statement given to Detective Nudd by the defendant would be
more harmful to defendant than the portions that were admitted."
(State's Br. at 35.)

This observation is pointless.
18

Mr. Leleae

never asked to have the entire statement placed in evidence.

The

doctrine of completeness requires admission of only so much as is
necessary to provide proper context.

The rule of completeness "is

subject to the qualification that only the other parts of the
document which are relevant and throw light upon the parts already
admitted become competent upon its introduction.

There is no rule

that either the whole document, or no part of it, is competent.
(Citations omitted.)" United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373
(6th Cir. 1982)

(quoting United States v. Littwin, 338 F.2d 141

(6th Cir. 1964) ) .

Only those portions of a statement which are

"relevant to an issue in the case" and necessary "to clarify or
explain the portion already received" need to be admitted.
10 F.3d at 1259.
context.

Haddad,

Mr. Leleae's statement should have been put in

This Court should reverse.
POINT IV. REHEARING IN LOPES HAS BEEN DENIED, AND
MR. LELEAE'S GANG ENHANCEMENT MUST BE VACATED.
(Replying to State's brief at Points IV and V, pp.
35-41)
The Supreme Court has denied rehearing in State v. Lopes,

365 Utah Adv. Rep. 17

(Utah 1999) .

Lopes is good law.

Mr.

Leleae's gang enhancement must be vacated, as the issue was not
submitted to the jury as Lopes requires.

This Court must reverse,

and vacate the gang enhancement that was imposed.
The State argues that any error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Not so.

Failure to submit material elements of

an offense to the jury is structural error:
The provision of our State Constitution which grants
accused persons the right to a trial by jury extends to
19

each and all of the facts which must be found to be
present to constitute the crime charged, and such right
may not be invaded by the presiding judge indicating to
the jury that any of such facts are established by the
evidence.
The constitutional provision may not be
disregarded under the pretext that there is no conflict
in the evidence or that the evidence will permit of but
one finding.
When an accused enters a plea of not
guilty, he has a right to have his entire case submitted
to the jury unless he waives such right by expressly
admitting at the trial the existence of some fact or
facts which is or are put in issue by the plea of not
guilty. These principles of law are so fundamental in
our system of criminal procedure that we deem it
unnecessary to cite cases and authorities in support
thereof.
State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1931).
"Failure to give an elements instruction for a crime
satisfies the manifest injustice standard under [Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure] 19(c)] and constitutes
reversible error as a matter of law."
Id.
"Further,
because ' "[t]he general rule is that an accurate
instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is
essential," ' failure to provide such an instruction is
reversible error that can never be considered harmless."
State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah App. 1998) . Here, the
jury was not given a proper elements instruction requiring it to
find the criminal culpability of three actors.

This error can

never be harmless.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, Mr. Leleae respectfully requests
that his conviction be reversed.

Specifically, he requests that

his gang enhanced sentence be vacated; that this court find the
evidence insufficient to establish second degree felony aggravated
assault and order an acquittal on that charge; and that this court
order that he receive a new trial to determine if he is not guilty,
20

guilty of class A misdemeanor assault, or guilty of third degree
felony aggravated assault.

j
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ADDENDUM A
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions

The

fourteenth

amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of las; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a
preliminary examination, the function of that examination
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay

evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.

Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 13.
[Prosecution by information or indictment -Grand j ury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of
the State, or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature.

Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 24.

[Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform

operation.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998) provides:
§ 76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms
apply to this title:
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily
injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a
substantial risk of death.
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily
injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that
creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary
disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998) provides:
§ 76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force
or violence, that causes or creates a substantial
risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the
person causes substantial bodily injury to another.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that
the accused caused serious bodily injury to another.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103

(Supp. 1998) provides:

§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to
a violation of Subsection (1)(a), uses a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (1) (a) is a
second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1) (b) is a third
degree felony.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202

(1995) provides:

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct
commission of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1

(1995) provides:

76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons
-- Enhanced penalties.
(1)
(a) A person who commits any offense listed
in Subsection (4) in concert with two or more
persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for
the offense as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as
used in this section means the defendant and
two or more other persons would be criminally
liable for the offense as parties under Section
76-2-202.
(2)
(a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment is returned, shall cause to be
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor
cases or the information or indictment in
felony cases notice that the defendant is
subject to the enhanced penalties provided
under this section. The notice shall be in a
clause separate from and in addition to the
substantive offense charged.
(b) If the subscription is not included
initially, the court may subsequently allow the
prosecutor to amend the charging document to
include the subscription if the court finds the
charging documents, including any statement of
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant
of the allegation he committed the offense in
concert with two or more persons, or if the
court finds the defendant has not otherwise
been substantially prejudiced by the omission.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed
under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor,
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term
of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other
secure correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor,
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term
of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other
secure correctional facility.
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an
enhanced minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an
enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an
enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for
which a life sentence is imposed, the convicted

person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of
20 years in prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58,
Chapter 37, 3 7a, 3 7b, or 3 7c, regarding
drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under
Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined
in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter
6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-504,
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509,
76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513,
76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and
76-6-520;
(2) any offense of obstructing government
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8,
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304,
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other
violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76,
Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76,
Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter
10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in
Section 76-10-1801;

(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency
Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as
defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5)
(a) This section does not create any
separate offense but provides an enhanced
penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced
penalties under this section that the persons
with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in
concert are not identified, apprehended,
charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a
different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced
penalty under this section. The imposition of
the penalty is contingent upon a finding by the
sentencing judge that this section is
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the
court shall enter written findings of fact
concerning the applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or
execution of the sentence required under this section
if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would
be best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances
justifying the disposition on the record and in
writing.

Rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may
require the introduction at that time of any other part
or any other writing or recorded statement which ought
in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.

Rule 611(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:

Rule 611. Mode and order of interrogation and presentation.
(a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of

the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3)
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination.
Cross-examination
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination.
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be
used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be
necessary to develop the witness' testimony. Ordinarily leading
questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party
calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading
questions.

Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the
number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus
such an additional number as will allow for all
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made,
and any such new juror may be challenged for cause.
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate
thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time
in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived.
The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury,
in the order in which they appear on the list, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the
jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the
defendant to conduct the examination of the prospective
jurors or may itself conduct the examination.
In the
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the
defendant to supplement the examination by such further
inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the
prospective jurors additional questions requested by
counsel or the defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or
to an individual juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called
to serve at a particular court or for the trial of
a particular action. A challenge to the panel is
an objection made to all jurors summoned and may
be taken by either party.

(i) A challenge to the panel can be
founded only on a material departure from the
procedure prescribed with respect to the
selection, drawing, summoning and return of
the panel.
(ii) The challenge to the panel
shall be taken before the jury is sworn and
shall be in writing or recorded by the
reporter. It shall specifically set forth
the facts constituting the grounds of the
challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the panel
is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing
may be had to try any question of fact upon
which the challenge is based. The jurors
challenged, and any other persons, may be
called as witnesses at the hearing thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide the
challenge. If the challenge to the panel is
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury
so far as the trial in question is concerned.
If a challenge is denied, the court shall
direct the selection of jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror
may be either peremptory or for cause. A
challenge to an individual juror may be made only
before the jury is sworn to try the action, except
the court may, for good cause, permit it to be
made after the juror is sworn but before any of
the evidence is presented. In challenges for
cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel
and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges
for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution
and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to
a juror for which no reason need be given.
In capital
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory
challenges.
In other felony cases each side is
entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor
cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory
challenges.
If there is more than one defendant the
court may allow the defendants additional peremptory
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately
or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or more
of the following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications
prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity
which renders one incapable of performing the
duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth degree to the person alleged to be injured

by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal,
business, fiduciary or other relationship between
the prospective juror and any party, witness or
person alleged to have been victimized or injured
by the defendant, which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds
that the prospective juror would be unable or
unwilling to return a verdict which would be free
of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or
employed by the state or a political subdivision
thereof;
(5) having been or being the party
adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or
having complained against or having been accused
by him in a criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury
which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which
has tried another person for the particular
offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally
sworn to try the same charge, and whose verdict
was set aside, or which was discharged without a
verdict after the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil
action brought against the defendant for the act
charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable
with death, the entertaining of such conscientious
opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the
juror from voting to impose the death penalty following
conviction regardless of the facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year
preceding, has been engaged or interested in
carrying on any business, calling or employment,
the carrying on of which is a violation of law,
where defendant is charged with a like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness,
either for or against the defendant on the
preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the
defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense
charged;
or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the cause, or
to either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging;
but
no person shall be disqualified as a juror by
reason of having formed or expressed an opinion

upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such
jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in
public journals or common notoriety, if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be
submitted to him.
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken
first by the prosecution and then by the defense
alternately.
Challenges for cause shall be completed
before peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate
jurors be impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order
in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are,
or become, unable or disqualified to perform their
duties. The prosecution and defense shall each have
one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate
juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same
qualifications, take the same oath and enjoy the same
privileges as regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a
juror is a privilege of the person exempted and is not
a ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall
be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they
and each of them will well and truly try the matter in
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict
according to the evidence and the instructions of the
court.
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NOTICE:
Although citation of unpublished
opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions
may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value
on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the
citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies
are furnished to the Court and all parties. See
General Order of November 29, 1993, suspending
10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
(The decision of the Court is referenced in a "Table
of Decisions Without Reported Opinions" appearing
in the Federal Reporter.)
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Cipriano ZAMUDIO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 96-2182.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 6, 1998.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS
and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT (FN*)
Cipriano Zamudio, Alfredo Pando, and Eleno
Osorio-Soto were tried jointly and convicted of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more
than five kilograms of cocaine. Zamudio appeals
his conviction claiming that (1) a codefendant's
counsel improperly commented on his right to
remain silent;
(2) the limitations placed on
Zamudio's cross-examination of Agent Mendonca
violated his right of confrontation; and (3) the trial
court improperly admitted hearsay statements by
Pando through the testimony of former codefendant
Jose Megallon in violation of his confrontation
rights. This court affirms.
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by police. He provided federal agents with a
statement and agreed to cooperate by allowing the
agents to tape conversations between him and other
alleged conspirators.
Zamudio, Pando, Osorio-Soto, Megallon, and
other alleged coconspirators were indicted for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more
than five kilograms of cocaine. Megallon pleaded
guilty to conspiracy and agreed to testify for the
government. Zamudio, Pando, and Osorio-Soto
were tried jointly and all three were convicted of
conspiracy in January 1996. Zamudio's appeal
centers on the testimony presented by two
government witnesses at the trial: Tony Mendonca,
a DEA agent, and Megallon.
At trial, Agent Mendonca testified that he, along
with Agent Chris Hoover, arrested Zamudio and
took Zamudio to a DEA office where he was
questioned.
Referring to a report, Mendonca
testified that Zamudio, after being read his Miranda
rights, admitted entering into an agreement with
Megallon to use a trailer for the transportation of
cocaine. Mendonca also testified that Zamudio
admitted going with Megallon to lease a trailer
suitable for the construction of a secret compartment
and admitted, when a satisfactory trailer was not
found, agreeing to use a trailer Megallon already
possessed.
On cross-examination, counsel for Osorio-Soto
asked Mendonca whether the statement he attributed
to Zamudio was made after Zamudio's arrest.
When Mendonca answered in the affirmative,
Osorio-Soto's counsel made a motion for severance
or to strike the statement, arguing:
I don't have any guarantee that Mr. Zamudio is
going to be taking the stand, so I would ask the
Court to strike any statement in regards to what
Mr. Mendonca said that Mr. Zamudio said in
regards to my client, Mr. Osorio-Soto. As an
alternative, I will go ahead and ask for a severance
in the case if Mr. Zamudio does not take the stand.

Background
In November 1994, authorities found over five
kilograms of cocaine in a hidden compartment of a
trailer. Subsequent investigation revealed that Jose
Megallon had leased the trailer. In January 1995,
Megallon voluntarily went to a Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) office after being contacted

Further explaining his objection, Osorio-Soto's
counsel stated:
Your Honor, based on the testimony of Mr.
Mendonca, he states that he questioned Mr.
Zamudio and that Mr. Zamudio showed that there
was in fact a conspiracy involving the trailer.
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That's the reason for asking for a severance, Your
Honor. The trailer is going to be used to implicate
my client, Mr. Osorio-Soto. I don't have any way
to cross-examination [sic] Mr. Zamudio regarding
the accuracy or inaccuracy of the statement
allegedly made by him.
The court denied Osorio-Soto's motion.
Counsel for Zamudio then cross-examined
Mendonca. In her cross-examination of Mendonca,
she attempted to use Agent Hoover's report,
Government Exhibit 20, which set out completely
Zamudio's
post-arrest
statements,
including
statements describing Pando's and Osorio-Soto's
involvement in the conspiracy. Both Osorio-Soto
and Pando objected to use of the report on hearsay
grounds. When the trial court inquired into the
government's position, the prosecutor stated his
belief that certain portions of the report needed to be
redacted. The trial court reserved ruling on whether
the document could be received in whole or in part.
The government then advised the trial court that it
had a redacted copy of the exhibit. Neither OsorioSoto nor Pando objected to the use of the redacted
report.
The government, therefore, withdrew
Government Exhibit 20 and Zamudio's counsel
continued cross-examining Mendonca using the
redacted report, Defendant's Exhibit 2-A. Because
the report was prepared by Agent Hoover, rather
than Mendonca, the redacted report was
provisionally received by the court, subject to
publication only upon testimony by Hoover verifying
the document.
*1186_ Later during the cross-examination of
Mendonca, Zamudio's counsel asked if Zamudio
had provided information to the agents about "the
agreement between Osorio and Pando to smuggle
cocaine."
Osorio-Soto' s counsel immediately
objected to the question and moved for severance.
The court denied severance and overruled the
objection. Mendonca answered the question in the
negative and Zamudio's counsel continued the crossexamination. The government then objected on the
grounds that allowing Zamudio's counsel to elicit
testimony regarding what Zamudio said about the
other codefendants would create a Bruton problem.
SeeBruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct.
1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). The court sustained
the government's objection and limited Zamudio's
cross-examination to the line of inquiry that was
addressed in direct examination.
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The other government witness whose testimony is
relevant to this appeal is Megallon. Megallon, a
coconspirator turned government informant, testified
about his involvement in the conspiracy and
interactions with the defendants.
Additionally,
through Megallon's testimony, the government
introduced and played three conversations which
were taped while Megallon was cooperating with the
DEA: a January 26, 1995 conversation between
Megallon and Zamudio;
a February 14, 1995
telephone conversation between Megallon and
Pando; and a February 22, 1995 conversation
between Megallon and Zamudio. The jury was also
provided with English and Spanish transcripts of
these taped conversations, which were primarily in
Spanish. While Zamudio does not challenge the
admissibility of the taped conversations between
Megallon and himself, he contends the trial court
erred in admitting the telephone conversation
between Pando and Megallon. Pando, who fled
after the first day of trial, did not testify, but the
trial of the charges against him proceeded in
absentia.
Comment on Zamudio's Failure to Testify
On appeal, Zamudio argues that Osorio-Soto's
counsel impermissibly commented on Zamudio's
failure to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights. Specifically, in commenting on his motion
for severance or to strike statements attributed to
Zamudio by Agent Mendonca, Osorio-Soto's
counsel, in the presence of the jury, stated: "I don't
have any guarantee that Mr. Zamudio is going to be
taking the stand"; "I will go ahead and ask for a
severance in the case if Mr. Zamudio does not take
the stand"; and "I don't have any way to crossexamin[e] Mr. Zamudio regarding the accuracy or
inaccuracy of the statement allegedly made by him."
(FN1)
Zamudio did not object to these statements during
trial. Therefore, our review is limited to plain
error. See United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d
819, 827 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, --- U.S. — , 118
S.Ct. 129, 139 L.Ed.2d 78 (1997). This court may
correct an error not raised at trial only if we find
there is "(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that
affect[s] substantial rights. If all three conditions
are met, [this] court may then exercise its discretion
to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public
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reputation of judicial proceedings." Johnson v.
United States, 520 U.S. 461,
---, 117 S.Ct.
1544, 1548-49, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (alterations
in original) (citations and internal quotations
omitted); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
For purposes of this appeal, we assume, without
deciding, that the statements Zamudio challenges
created error and the error is plain. Before this
court may correct such an error, however, the
defendant has the burden of showing that the error
affected substantial rights, which generally means
the defendant must show he was prejudiced by the
error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see
also
Toro-Pelaez,
107 F.3d
at 827-28.
Furthermore, even if defendant meets his burden of
showing the error affected substantial rights, this
court may not order correction unless it also finds
the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.
See
Johnson, 520 U.S. at — , 117 S.Ct. at 1550. In
this case, Zamudio has failed to show he was
prejudiced by the alleged error. Furthermore, even
if Zamudio had shown prejudice, there exists no
basis in the record for concluding that the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.
*1186_ Zamudio argues the statements were
prejudicial because (1) they were direct comments
on his failure to testify; (2) the nature of the
government's case was such that only his own
testimony could have fully contradicted the
government's evidence; and (3) the government's
case relied heavily on the testimony of Megallon, a
convicted informant, and the challenged testimony
of Agent Mendonca regarding Zamudio's admission.
A number of other factors, however, mitigate any
prejudicial effect the statements could have had on
the jurors' deliberations.
First, the statements, while made in the presence
of the jury, were not directed at the jurors. This
case is therefore distinguishable from cases
involving comments made to jurors during closing
arguments.
Second, the comments did not suggest the jurors
should infer Zamudio's guilt from his failure to
testify. Cf United States v. Wing, 104 F.3d 986,
990-91 (7th Cir.1997) (holding court's remarks,
while directly commenting on defendant's failure to
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testify, did not constitute plain error because they
did not invite jurors to infer guilt from defendant's
failure to testify and there was substantial evidence
of defendant's guilt); United States v. Sarno, 73
F.3d 1470, 1498 (9th Cir.1995) (holding single
improper comment by prosecutor regarding
defendant's failure to testify did not mandate
reversal when comment did not invite jury to infer
guilt from silence and judge gave jurors curative
instruction); United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522,
1534 (11th Cir.1989) ("When the 'comment' [on the
failure of the accused to testify] comes from an actor
(such as counsel for a codefendant) without an
institutional interest in the defendant's guilt, .... the
court should ask whether the comment actually or
implicitly invited the jury to infer guilt from
silence."). Rather, the comments focused only on
the ability of Osorio-Soto to cross-examine Zamudio
regarding statements Zamudio made to agents after
his arrest.
Third, the jurors were properly instructed that they
may not infer guilt from a defendant's failure to
testify. Specifically, upon conclusion of the closing
arguments, the judge instructed the jury that "a
Defendant is presumed by law to be innocent. The
law does not require a Defendant to prove his
innocence or produce any evidence at all, and no
inference whatsoever may be drawn from the
election of a Defendant not to testify." (Emphasis
added.)
Jurors are presumed to follow the
instructions given to them. See United States v.
Coleman, 1 F.3d 1500, 1506 (10th Cir.1993).
Finally, contrary to Zamudio's assertions, there
was substantial evidence of his guilt. Not only did
Mendonca testify as to Zamudio's post-arrest
admission and Megallon testify as to Zamudio's
involvement in the conspiracy, but the government
also introduced two taped conversations in which
Megallon and Zamudio discussed the conspiracy and
what was to be done about the trailer which
government agents seized.
Given the numerous factors mitigating any effect
of the statements regarding Zamudio's failure to
testify, Zamudio failed to meet his burden of
showing he was prejudiced by the alleged error.
Moreover, the alleged error did not seriously affect
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. This court therefore holds that the
statements by Osorio-Soto's counsel do not
constitute reversible error.
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Restriction on Defendant's Cross-Examination of
Mendonca
Zamudio contends the district court impermissibly
restricted his cross-examination of Agent Mendonca
by prohibiting inquiry into portions of Zamudio's
post-arrest statement. On direct examination, Agent
Mendonca testified that, among other things,
Zamudio admitted agreeing to use a trailer for the
transportation of cocaine and admitted going with
Megallon to rent a suitable trailer. During the
cross-examination of Agent Mendonca, Zamudio's
counsel tried to elicit testimony regarding other
statements Zamudio made at the time of his arrest.
Because these additional statements apparently
would implicate codefendants Pando and OsorioSoto, creating a Bruton problem, the district court
limited Zamudio's counsel to the line of inquiry
addressed in direct examination and allowed only a
redacted version of defendant's post-arrest statement
to be used. Zamudio maintains that this limitation
on his cross-examination of Agent Mendonca
violated his confrontation rights. He argues that
because Agent Mendonca testified about portions of
his post-arrest statement on direct examination, the
district court was required to allow him to crossexamine Agent Mendonca concerning other portions
of the post-arrest statement which were necessary to
place the admitted evidence into context.
*1186_ "We review de novo whether a defendant's
confrontation rights were violated by reason of
improper cross-examination restrictions...." United
States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1529 (10th
Cir.1994).
While the Confrontation Clause
guarantees defendants an "opportunity for effective
cross-examination," it does not guarantee a "crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish."
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct.
292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985); accord Pedraza, 27
F.3d at 1529.
While the government was entitled to introduce
Zamudio's
admissions
under
Fed.R.Evid.
801(d)(2)(A), Zamudio was not similarly entitled to
offer his own exculpatory statements through the
testimony of Agent Mendonca because such
statements, if offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, would constitute hearsay.
See
Fed.R.Evid. 801, 802.
Zamudio, however,
maintains that because certain portions of his postarrest statements were admitted on direct
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examination, the district court was required to admit
other portions of his statement to place the admitted
evidence into context.
Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
provides that "[w]hen a writing or recorded
statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an
adverse party may require the introduction at that
time of any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it."
While
Rule 106 explicitly applies only to writings and
recorded statements, the rule of completeness
embodied in Rule 106 is " 'substantially applicable
to oral testimony, as well1 by virtue of Fed.R.Evid.
611(a), which obligates the court to 'make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth.' " United States v.
Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting
United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 650 n. 5
(2d Cir.1989)); see also United States v. Li, 55
F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir.1995); United States v.
Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258-59 (7th Cir.1993); 1
Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger,
Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 106.02[3] & nn.
12-13 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.1997).
Accordingly, a redacted version of a defendant's
post-arrest statement is impermissible if it "unfairly
distort[s] the original" or "exclude[s] substantially
exculpatory information." Mussaleen, 35 F.3d at
696; see also United States v. Washington, 952
F.2d 1402, 1404 (D.C.Cir.1991); United States v.
Kaminski, 692 F.2d 505, 522 (8th Cir.1982).
The rule of completeness, however, does not
necessarily require admission of a defendant's entire
statement. Rather, only those portions which are
"relevant to an issue in the case" and necessary "to
clarify or explain the portion already received" need
to be admitted. Haddad, 10 F.3d at 1259; see also
Li, 55 F.3d at 329-30; cf. United States v. Branch,
91 F.3d 699, 728 (5th Cir.1996) (discussing Rule
106 and noting that "[although different circuits
have elaborated Rule 106's 'fairness' standard in
different ways, common to all is the requirement
that the omitted portion be relevant and necessary to
qualify, explain, or place into context the portion
already introduced" (internal citations and quotations
omitted)), cert, denied, — U.S. —-, —-, 117 S.Ct.
1466, 1467, 137 L.Ed.2d 681 (1997).
In
determining whether a disputed portion of a
statement must be admitted, the trial court should
consider whether "(1) it explains the admitted
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evidence, (2) places the admitted evidence in
context, (3) avoids misleading the jury, and (4)
insures fair and impartial understanding of the
evidence." Li, 55 F.3d at 330; see also Haddad,
10 F.3d at 1259.
*1186_ Zamudio's claim that his confrontation
rights were violated, therefore, turns on whether the
excluded portions of his post-arrest statement were
necessary to explain or place into context the
evidence admitted during direct examination. If the
rule of completeness was not violated by the
exclusion of this evidence, the limitation placed on
Zamudio's cross-examination was proper because
the excluded portions were not otherwise admissible.
Cf. United States v. Thuna, 786 F.2d 437, 442 n. 10
(1st Cir.1986) (noting that because redaction of
report of defendant's post-arrest statements was not
prejudicial to defendant, the district court was within
its discretion to limit cross-examination regarding
the report).
Zamudio did not designate the written report of his
post-arrest statements as part of the record on appeal
nor did he make a proffer as to what the omitted
portions of his statement would have shown. This
court is therefore unable to evaluate the precise
content of the omitted portions of Zamudio's
statement.
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to on direct examination nor does he argue that the
portions show his actions were done only under
duress. The excluded portions therefore do not
appear to be exculpatory.
This court cannot conclude the omitted portions of
Zamudio's post-arrest statements were necessary to
explain the admitted evidence or place that evidence
into context. If, as it appears, the omitted portions
of Zamudio's post-arrest statement did no more than
show Osorio-Soto's and Pando's involvement in the
scheme, the rule of completeness did not require
their admission because Osorio-Soto's and Pando's
involvement is not necessary to explain or place into
context Zamudio's act of agreeing to participate in
the conspiracy or his act of accompanying Megallon
to rent a trailer. Cf. Li, 55 F.3d at 330 (holding
statement that defendant was threatened by
codefendant was not necessary to explain or
understand defendant's admission to making
payment to codefendant absent a coercion defense).
Because the record on appeal is insufficient to
support Zamudio's assertion that his confrontation
rights were violated and because Zamudio's
appellate presentation does not suggest any
legitimate basis for admission of the redacted
portions of his statement, exclusion of the testimony
was not error.
Admission of Taped Conversation

In his opening brief Zamudio simply states that the
district court improperly limited inquiry into those
portions of his post-arrest statement "wherein he
attempted to shift the blame from himself to codefendants Osorio and Pando."
Specifically,
Zamudio complains that his counsel was unable to
inquire into "the context of [his] admissions, the
purpose of Pando and Osorio in renting the trailer,
and other aspects of an alleged agreement between
Osorio and Pando of which Zamudio was not part."
In his reply brief he asserts that the omitted portions
"attempted to place into context his activities in the
alleged conspiracy and contrast them with the
purposeful involvement of the co-defendants Osorio
and Pando."
It appears, therefore, that the
excluded portions of Zamudio's statement detail
Osorio-Soto's and Pando's involvement in the
conspiracy and attempt to shift the blame from
Zamudio to his coconspirators based primarily on
their more meaningful involvement in the scheme.
Zamudio has not argued that the excluded portions
of the statement show he did not participate in the
conspiracy in the manner Agent Mendonca testified

Zamudio's final argument is that the tape and
transcript of the February 14, 1995 telephone
conversation between Megallon and Pando
constituted inadmissible hearsay and that the district
court's erroneous admission of that taped
conversation and transcript into evidence violated his
confrontation rights because Pando did not testify at
the trial. The government maintains the taped
statements were properly admitted as coconspirator
statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), which
provides that "[a] statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he
statement is offered against a party and is ... a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
In the unpublished opinion, United States v.
Osorio-Soto, No. 96-2184, 1998 WL 58106 (10th
Cir. Feb. 12, 1998), this court considered whether
the same taped conversation was properly admitted
against Zamudio's codefendant Osorio-Soto. (FN2)
In Osorio-Soto, this court held that the taped
conversation between Megallon and Pando did not
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occur "during the course" of the conspiracy and was
therefore inadmissible against Osorio-Soto. See id.
at *2. Having previously concluded that the taped
conversation did not occur during the course of the
conspiracy, this court now holds that the tape and
transcript were inadmissible against Zamudio. This
court, however, may uphold Zamudio's conviction if
admission of the taped conversation and transcript
constituted harmless error.
*1186_ Because Zamudio argues admission of the
taped conversation violated his confrontation rights,
we apply the constitutional harmless error standard.
See United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1497 (10th
Cir.1993). Accordingly, this court will uphold
Zamudio's conviction only if it concludes the error
was " 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id.
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24,
87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). Upon
reviewing the record, this court concludes admission
of the taped conversation between Pando and
Megallon was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the evidence it contained implicating
Zamudio was extremely weak, while other evidence
of his guilt was overwhelming. Cf. Delaware v.
VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89
L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (listing "importance of the
witnesses] testimony in the prosecution's case" and
"the overall strength of the prosecution's case"
among factors courts should consider in determining
whether violation of Confrontation Clause
constitutes harmless error);
Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54, 89 S.Ct. 1726,
23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969) (holding violation of
confrontation rights under Bruton was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because case against
defendant was overwhelming).
The taped conversation between Megallon and
Pando did not mention Zamudio by name. The only
apparent reference to Zamudio during the
conversation was made by Pando in response to
Megallon's statements about the police. Megallon
stated that the police had contacted him and he did
not know what to tell the police because they already
had the trailer. In reply Pando stated, "What do you
want me tell you" and repeatedly instructed
Megallon to ask "that guy" about the situation.
During direct examination, Megallon testified that
when Pando told him to talk to "that guy," he
understood Zamudio was the person referenced.
There is nothing else in the taped conversation
implicating Zamudio.
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In contrast to the limited evidence of guilt found in
the taped conversation between Megallon and
Pando, other evidence of Zamudio's guilt was
overwhelming.
Agent Mendonca testified that
Zamudio admitted entering into an agreement with
Megallon to transport cocaine and admitted going
with Megallon to rent a suitable trailer. Megallon
also testified that he met with Zamudio and Pando at
a tire shop and that during this meeting, the plan to
transport drugs was discussed. Megallon testified
that he was asked to participate in the scheme by
renting a trailer and both Zamudio and Pando
informed him of how the trailer was to be used. He
further testified that both Zamudio and Pando
accompanied him to the rental place and when a
suitable trailer was not found, Megallon allowed
Zamudio and Pando to use his leased trailer.
Additionally, Megallon testified that he subsequently
observed new rivets three to four feet from the front
of the trailer he delivered to Zamudio and Pando,
which is consistent with Danny Martinez's (FN3)
testimony that the seized trailer had a false
compartment in the front containing cocaine.
Finally, the government introduced two taped
conversations between Zamudio and Megallon,
discussing the conspiracy and the trailer. Any
negative inference which could be drawn from the
challenged tape recorded conversation between
Pando and Megallon pales in comparison to the
overwhelming evidence of guilt found elsewhere in
the record. This court therefore concludes the error
in admitting the taped conversation was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment of the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Judge McWilliams concurs in the result.
FN* This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The
court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment
may be cited under the terms and conditions of
10th Cir. R. 36.3.
FN1. At the outset of the trial, the district judge
instructed the parties that "no bench conferences
[would] be permitted" and that all speaking
objections would be considered either "before the
day's business begins, during recess or at the end
of the day." While this court appreciates the need
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141 F.3d 1186, U.S. v. Zamudio, (C.A.IO (N.M ) 1998)
for efiicicnc}, the judge's instructions created
problems for the parties in this case. Had the
judge permitted limited but necessary bench
conferences, counsel for Osorio-Soto could have
explained his objection to the testimony outside the
hearing of the jury. This issue therefore could
have been avoided entirely
*1186_ FN2. Zamudio's codefendanl Osorio-Soto
argued that all three taped conversations were
inadmissible against him: the January 26, 1995
conversation between Megallon and Zamudio, the
February 14, 1995 telephone conversation between
Megallon and Pando, and the February 22, 1995
conversation between Megallon and Zamudio. See
United States v. Osorio-Soto, No. 96-2184, 1998
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WL 58106, ai H UOth Cir. Feb. 12, 1998).
Zamudio does not appeal admission of the two
taped conversation between him and Megallon
because a party's own statement may be offered
against the party under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).
Zamudio and Osorio-Soto, however, are in the
same position as to the taped conversation between
Megallon and Pando because neither was a party to
the conversation.
Both argue that the taped
conversation between Megallon and Pando
constituted inadmissible hearsay.
FN3. Danny Martinez, who is a sergeant with the
Motor Transportation Division of the Taxation and
Revenue Department for the State of New Mexico,
was involved in the search of the seized trailer.
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